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Abstract
This study estimates the price elasticity of demand for casino gaming. A demand model is
estimated with data from a panel of 50 casinos operating in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and
Missouri between 1991 and 2005. The model isolates the impact of changes in the casino win
percentage or price on the wagering handle, controlling for the impact of other operating,
economic, and regulatory determinants of the wagering handle. The model estimates suggest
that the wagering handle in the short run is inelastic to price changes, and that in the long run
the wagering handle is unit elastic if not somewhat inelastic.
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Prior to 1989, only two states had legalized full-fledged casino gambling – Nevada in 1931 
and New Jersey in 1978. By 2006, gambling was being conducted on electronic gaming devices 
(EGDs) and on various table games such as poker, black jack, craps, and roulette at commercial 
casinos in no less than 17 other states besides New Jersey and Nevada.
1  Generally, state 
legislatures have legalized commercial gaming at casinos to generate revenue from excise taxes 
imposed on the casino owners as well as to promote local and regional economic development 
and tourism. The preliminary results generated by this study focus on the potential impact of 
increasing casino tax rates. Table I summarizes the FY 2006 revenue generated from casino 
taxes in the states where commercial casinos operated. The revenue data serves to highlight the 
increasing importance of casino taxes in a number of states.
The study estimates the elasticity of wagering at casinos by gamblers due to changes in the 
percentage of those wagers that are retained by the casino. This measure is equivalent to a price 
elasticity, where the total amount wagered by gamblers (referred to as the handle) represents the 
demand for casino gaming and the percentage of the handle retained by the casino (referred to as 
the win percentage or take-out rate) represents the price paid by the gambler to play the casino 
games. Suits (1979) suggested that the price elasticity of demand for gambling has significant 
implications for tax policies of states where gambling operations are regulated and utilized to 
generate tax revenue. Given the increasing dependence of states on casino excise taxes imposed 
on the wagering dollars retained by casinos (referred to as the win), Suits’ observation appears to 
be gaining in relevance. If casino tax increases lead to corresponding increases in the win 
percentage, then the price elasticity of demand would provide important information to policy 
makers regarding the potential response by gamblers to tax rate increases and the potential 
revenue yield from these tax rate increases.
The price elasticity is estimated utilizing operating data from a panel of casinos located in 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri. These four states impose two excise taxes on casino 
owners: (1) a wagering tax and (2) an admission tax. The wagering tax, which is imposed in 
some form by all states where casino gaming is allowed, is the predominant revenue raiser of the 
two casino taxes imposed by the states examined in this study.
 The wagering tax is imposed as a 
percentage of the win generated by a casino. Thus, the win percentage represents a gross price 
paid by the gambler with a portion remaining with the casino owner (the before tax price) and a 
portion transferred to the state as wagering tax. While Missouri continues to utilize a flat rate 
wagering tax, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa have adopted graduated tax rate structures for their 
respective wagering taxes. Unlike the other states that permit casino gambling, Illinois, Indiana, 
and Missouri also each impose admission taxes on the casino owners.
2  The admission tax 
requires the casino owner to pay a fixed dollar amount per patron entering the casino. 
Nevertheless, an admission tax essentially represents an indirect tax on casino win, albeit where 
the tax rate varies as a percentage of the win generated from each casino patron.
1 Approximately 28 states, including some with commercial casinos, contained tribal casinos not subject to state 
authorization or state gaming regulators.
2 A locally adopted admission tax is allowed in Iowa, but no such tax is imposed by the state.
1The remainder of this paper is divided into the following sections: (1) a brief review of 
pertinent empirical research estimating the demand for casino gaming, state lottery games, and 
pari-mutuel horse racing; (2) a description  of the econometric model, sample data, and 
estimation methodology; (3) a discussion of the regression results; and (4) some concluding 
remarks.
2. Literature Review
Research estimating the demand for casino gaming, its determinants, and the price elasticity 
of demand for casino gaming is quite limited. In contrast, a larger literature exists that examines 
the price elasticity of demand for lottery games and pari-mutuel horse racing. Together, these 
studies provide a sufficient basis for estimating rather illustrative and robust demand equations 
for casino gaming.
Several studies have, with varying results, estimated the impact of the take-out rate on 
lottery sales. Vrooman (1976), Vasche (1985) and Mikesell (1987), for instance, fail to find 
statistical evidence of a relationship between the take-out rate and lottery sales. In contrast, 
DeBoer (1986) and Gulley and Scott (1993) estimate statistically significant relationships 
between take-out rate and lottery sales based on very different lottery samples.
3 DeBoer utilizes 
sales and take-out rate data from a panel of seven states operating lotteries from 1974 to 1983, 
while Gulley and Scott utilize weekly and biweekly drawings data from lotto games in four 
states for varying periods during the late-1980s and early-1990s. Estimates from these two 
studies are varied, with DeBoer estimating an elasticity equal to -1.19 and Gulley and Scott’s 
four estimates ranging from -0.19 to -1.92.
The preponderance of studies evaluating the price elasticity of demand for pari-mutuel 
wagering generated statistically significant elasticity estimates. While Morgan & Vasche (1979, 
1982) fail to find statistical evidence that the take-out rate affects the handle per patron at 
racetracks, they do find that the take-out rate has a statistically significant negative impact on 
racetrack attendance. As a result, increases in the take-out rate result in lower attendance and 
therefore aggregate declines in the pari-mutuel handle. Thalheimer and Ali (1995) also estimate a 
similar result. In contrast, Gruen (1976), Suits (1979), Pescatrice (1980), and Thalheimer and Ali 
(1992, 1995) generate statistically significant elasticity estimates on wagering handle ranging 
from -0.5 to -2.81. These estimates are generated utilizing varying data sets ranging from panels 
of state-level pari-mutuel data (Suits, 1979), panels of data for different race meetings or 
racetracks in a single state (Gruen, 1976; Pescatrice, 1980; and Thalheimer and Ali, 1995), and 
single track data (Thalheimer and Ali, 1992). What’s more, some of these studies successfully 
test other demand determinants such as measures of racetrack operations, state economic 
measures, and indicators of a racetrack’s local market structure. 
Only a handful of studies investigate the potential determinants of wagering levels at 
casinos, with only one study generating a point estimate for the price elasticity. Nichols (1998a, 
1998b) focuses on the impact of various state-imposed regulatory requirements on the win 
generated by casinos in Iowa and Atlantic City. The studies indicate that regulatory restrictions 
3 Cook and Clotfelter (1993) estimate a statistically significant direct relationship between lottery sales and lottery 
payout rates (the percentage of total sales paid out to winners).  
2such as betting and loss limits, cruising requirements for riverboat casinos, and casino and 
gaming area size restrictions result in lower win totals than would otherwise be realized in the 
absence of the restrictions. Nichols (1998a) also finds significant seasonal effects, with summer 
win totals generated by Iowa riverboat casinos significantly higher than win totals generated in 
the winter. Interestingly, while Nichols (1998b) controls for the impact of variation in income on 
win totals, the estimated impact is statistically inconclusive. More recently, Moss, Ryan, and 
Wagoner (2003) find that casino win exhibits a growth pattern over time consistent with Butler’s 
S-shaped product life cycle curve. This growth pattern suggests that initial periods of high 
revenue growth tend to be followed by a marked leveling off of growth rates as markets mature. 
Unfortunately, none of these studies attempt to estimate the price elasticity of casino gaming. 
Thalheimer and Ali (2003) generate an estimate of the price elasticity of wagering on EGDs 
at casinos in Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri from 1991 to 1998, developing a much more detailed 
model specification than the research highlighted above. Their demand model specifies measures 
of casino operations including the EGD win percentage, deregulatory policies, and market 
attributes such as customer access to the casino and income within the market area of the casino. 
The data analysis estimates the average price elasticity at about -0.99, and suggests that the price 
elasticity declined from about -1.5 in 1991 to about -0.9 in 1998. It also indicates a strong 
nonlinear income effect and suggests that regulatory restrictions like cruising requirements for 
riverboat casinos and market-specific factors such as customer access and income are important 
determinants of casino win.
3. Data and Econometric Methodology
The estimating equation for this study takes on the general form specified in below in (1):
                            
  it it it it it X Income Win Handle e b b b b + + + + = 3 2 1 0 %                                    (1)
where Handle is the per capita EGD handle in real dollars (base year = 1991) within the spatial 
market of a casino; Win% is the calendar year percentage of EGD handle that is retained by the 
casinos after winnings are paid from the handle amount to players; Income is the calendar year 
per capita personal income in real dollars (base year = 1991) within the spatial market of a 
casino;  X  comprises additional operating, economic, and regulatory policy determinants of 
wagering handle; and i and t are, respectively, casino and year indices. Summary statistics for the 
variables specified in estimating equation are presented in Table II.
Fixed effects panel regression procedures are employed to estimate the demand function 
utilizing an unbalanced panel of 50 casinos operating in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and Missouri 
between 1991 and 2005. The cross-section observations correspond to casinos and, as a result, 
the data captures the temporal variation in wagering demand for each casino in the panel and the 
variation in wagering demand between casinos. This means the panel data provides substantially 
more variation in wagering demand than could be generated with a series corresponding to only 
one casino. The panel data also allows us to explain the differences between casinos that are not 
captured by the explanatory variables specified in the models. Aggregate year effects are also 
employed in the model specifications to account for the effects of cyclical and other general 
economic changes that are not captured by the explanatory variables specified in the models.
3All model specifications are corrected for an AR(1) error structure.
4 Model specifications are 
estimated in logarithmic form. This ensures that the predicted values of Handle are nonnegative, 
and controls for the potential nonlinear relationships between Handle and Income. The double-
log form also allows the estimated coefficients on the independent variables to be interpreted as 
elasticities.
To compute  Handle  for each casino, the spatial market of the casino is assumed to be 
contained within the counties having a centroid within 100 miles of the casino.
5 Annual EGD 
handle totals were computed from monthly totals reported by state gaming regulators in Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri. Population is taken from the counties contained within the casino 
market. Annual county population estimates were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. EGD 
handle was selected to represent the demand for casino gaming because: (1) the handle for table 
games can be difficult to measure; and (2) the win percentage on EGDs can be readily altered by 
casino owners while win percentage for table games reflects traditional payout rates. This should 
not bias the estimation results since EGD win represents the overwhelming percentage of total 
win of the casinos in the four states being studied – ranging from 83% in Indiana to 91% in Iowa. 
Win% is computed from monthly EGD handle and EGD win totals reported by state gaming 
regulators. Win% is expected to be inversely related to Handle. Income is also computed from 
the annual income and population in counties where the county centroid is within 100 miles of 
the casino. Annual county personal income estimates were obtained from the U. S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Income is expected to be directly related to the Handle.
Other operating determinants specified in the estimating model include the number of days 
during the calendar year that a casino was open for operations (Days), and the monthly average 
number of EGDs and table games supplied by a casino during the calendar year (EGDs and 
Table Games). Days controls for casinos starting up or going out of business and operating for 
only a partial year during the period of analysis. Days and EGDs are each expected to be directly 
related to Handle. Table Games, on the other hand, may represent a substitute for EGDs. Thus, 
Table Games is expected to be inversely related to Handle. Data for these three operational 
measures was obtained from monthly financial reports of state gaming regulators.
The estimating model also includes two binary dummy variables describing important 
regulatory   policy   determinants   of  Handle.   One   regulatory   dummy   variable   (Cruising 
Requirement) indicates whether a state employs a cruising requirement for riverboat casinos 
while the second regulatory dummy variable (Loss Limit) indicates whether a state imposes a 
daily loss limit for gamblers. Both regulatory determinants are expected to have a negative 
4 The Hausman (1978) model specification test was employed on all of the model specifications. In each case, the 
chi-square statistic was significant at the 1% level, indicating that the fixed effects model specification was superior 
to the random effects model specification. I also employed the Wooldridge (2002) test for first order autocorrelation 
in panel data models on all the model specifications. In each case, the F statistic is significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that the models have an AR(1) error structure. I correct for the AR(1) error structure by estimating the 
model specifications with STATA’s xtregar procedure which estimates fixed effects linear models with an AR(1) 
error structure using Prais-Winsten estimation procedure.
5 The 100 mile spatial market is consistent with findings on the spatial market of riverboat casinos by Illinois 
Gaming Board (1997), Thalhiemer and Ali (2003), Przybylski and Littlepage (1997).
4impact on  Handle. Both variables were developed from information in monthly and annual 
reports of state gaming regulators.
4. Estimation Results
Coefficient estimates for nine model specifications are reported in Table III. The estimating 
models fit the data relatively well, registering a within R-squared between 0.70 and 0.76. All of 
the variables except for Table Games are statistically significant at the 10% level or better. The 
operating, regulatory, and economic control variables (with the exception of Table Games) are 
statistically significant and provide intuitive and reasonable estimating results.  Days,  EGDs, 
Cruising Requirement, and Loss Limit are statistically significant at better than the 1% level in all 
model specifications. Income is also statistically significant at better than the 5% level in all the 
model specifications. The coefficient estimates on these control variables are robust, being 
statistically significant, exhibiting the expected sign, and exhibiting similar values over all model 
specifications.
The coefficient estimates suggest that the EGD handle generated by a casino is: (1) 
increasing in the number days the casino operates during the year; (2) increasing in the number 
of EGDs the casino supplies during the year; (3) increasing in the current income of individuals 
within the casino’s spatial market; (4) is systematically lower for casinos operating in states 
where riverboat casinos must cruise to conduct gaming operations; and (5) is systematically 
lower for casinos operating in states that impose daily limits on losses that gamblers may incur.
Overall, the coefficient estimates on the control variables are fairly consistent with estimates 
from prior research. The following are a few comparisons to the estimates generated by 
Thalheimer  and  Ali (2003). The elasticities  on operating  days  and EGDs generated  by 
Thalheimer and Ali are 1.38 and 1.12, respectively. The elasticities generated by this study are 
consistently lower, and are statistically different from the values derived by Thalheimer and Ali.
6 
The smaller elasticities may reflect the maturation of Midwest gaming markets and an increased 
level of competition that wasn’t present in Thalheimer and Ali’s sample. Thalheimer and Ali 
estimate the impact of the cruising requirement at -0.43 and the loss limit at -0.45. The estimates 
on the cruising requirement from this study are all substantially lower and are all statistically 
different than the value generated by Thalheimer and Ali. In contrast, the impact of loss limits 
are estimated at a higher level by this study, however, none of the estimates are statistically 
different from the value generated by Thalheimer and Ali. The coefficient differences may again 
be the function of the different panels employed in the two studies. The span of time for this 
study provides a much better comparison of operating differences under cruising requirements 
and dockside gaming regimes. The time frame for Thalheimer and Ali’s study would only allow 
for a comparison to be made relative to Iowa which made the change in 1994. The time frame for 
this study would provide for that comparison and comparison to dockside gaming performance 
by Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri casinos, with Illinois eliminating the cruising requirement in 
1999 and Indiana and Missouri doing so in 2002. Similarly, the sample for this study would 
include many more data points than Thalheimer and Ali’s sample relating to casinos operating 
6 The hypothesis test is based on the test statistic 
SE
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= , where w is the elasticity value estimated by 
Thalheimer and Ali (2003).
5with and without loss limits, with Illinois and Indiana never employing loss limits, Iowa 
eliminating loss limits in 1994, and Missouri maintaining loss limits. 
The estimated income elasticity ranges from about 1.8 to 1.9 in Models 4, 5, 7, and 9, with a 
lower income elasticity of about 1.4 generated by Model 6. The estimates appear to be consistent 
with prior research suggesting that wagering handle is highly responsive to income variation, 
whether the wagering is on lottery games, pari-mutuel racing, or casino gaming.
7 What’s more, 
none of the elasticities are statistically different from 1, suggesting that on average handle is unit 
elastic to changes in income.
The different specifications in Models 1 through 5 generate robust estimates for the focal 
variable  Win%.   The   coefficient   estimates   are   statistically   significant   in   these   model 
specifications at better than the 1% level. In addition, the coefficient estimates exhibit the 
expected sign and similar values. The price elasticity ranges from a low of -.75 to a high of -.87, 
suggesting that a 10% increase in the price of playing EGDs leads to a 7.5% to 8.7% decline in 
the EGD handle. The price elasticity estimates are not statistically different from -1.0 at a 10% or 
lower confidence level.
8  This suggests that casino wagering is unit elastic, if not somewhat 
inelastic, to changes in the win percentage. In comparison, the average price elasticity estimated 
by Thalheimer and Ali (2003) with their more limited panel dataset, was -0.99. 
Model 6 explores whether price changes have a larger impact on casino wagering in the long 
run versus the short run. Potentially, it may take time for players to adjust to changes in the win 
percentage such that their wagering patterns are more elastic over several time periods than in 
the initial period after the price change. Model 6 contains the current-year win percentage and 
one-, two-, and three-year lags of the win percentage to estimate both the short run and long run 
effect. The coefficients on the current-year win percentage and the one-year lag are both 
statistically significant and negative. This suggests that in the short run the handle is price 
inelastic though the long run estimate suggests unit elasticity. Thus, gamblers fail to adjust 
immediately to variation in the win percentage, with the adjustment process potentially carrying 
on for more than one year after the price change. Players may adjust somewhat slowly because 
the win percentage is not an advertised price like prices of typical goods and services. Moreover, 
the adjustment process may depend on amenities and marketing programs offered by the casino 
employing the price change as well as competing casinos. Thus, amenities and marketing 
programs at a casino that increases price may continue to make the casino attractive to players in 
the short run, but in the long run players may shift to competing casinos as they adjust their 
pricing, amenities, and marketing programs. The adjustment process also may depend a great 
deal on the distance players must travel in order to gamble at another casino. Small increases in 
the win percentage may not result in any marked decline in handle if most players have to travel 
a substantial distance to gamble at another casino.  
7 Thalheimer and Ali (2003) do not log transform the income variable in their estimating model, so no test is carried 
out of the difference between the income elasticity estimates generated by this study and an elasticity value 
generated by Thalheimer and Ali.
8 The hypothesis test is based on the test statistic 
SE
(-1) -
  t 
b
= .
6Model 7, 8, and 9 investigate a few additional effects relating to the price elasticity. Model 7 
investigates whether the price elasticity is time dependent and, thus, has varied from 1991 to 
2005. The interaction of the time trend and win percentage variables in Model 7 is not 
statistically significant, thus, there appears to be no discernible change in the average price 
elasticity from 1991 to 2005. This result departs from estimates by Thalheimer and Ali (2003) 
suggesting that the average price elasticity in Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri declined from about 
-1.5 in 1991 to about -0.9 in 1998. Similar to Model 7, Model 8 investigates whether the price 
elasticity is income dependent. While the coefficient values appear to suggest that the price 
elasticity declines as player income increases, the interaction of income and win percentage is 
not statistically significant. Finally, Model 9 fails to suggest that the win percentage has any 
nonlinear effects on the wagering handle.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I employ fixed effects regression procedures to estimate the determinants of 
wagering on EGDs at casinos operating in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri between1991 to 
2005. I estimate various specifications of the demand for wagering on EGDs. I also generate 
estimates of the elasticity of wagering on EGDs for changes in the win percentage – essentially 
the price elasticity of demand for gaming on these devices. Generally, the estimating results are 
intuitive, robust, and consistent with the pertinent, albeit small, literature on the subject. The 
regression results suggest that demand for gaming at casinos is affected by variations in the 
casino’s own operating  structure, regulatory requirements,  player’s  income,  and the win 
percentage imposed by the casino. Specifically, the regression results suggest that the price 
elasticity of demand for gaming is inelastic in the short run, and is roughly unitary elastic in the 
long run. 
The elasticity estimates suggest that casino’s may be in a position to raise the win 
percentage in response to casino tax increases. It also means that tax rate increases could 
potentially increase government revenue while not decreasing net gaming revenue to the casinos. 
This assumes that the casinos choose to pass the tax rate increase forward to players by 
increasing the win percentage on games to completely offset the tax rate increase. The extent and 
the method by which casino tax increases are absorbed by casinos or passed on to suppliers, 
employees, or patrons requires further research to delineate the true impact of the rate increases 
on the industry and on the wagering handle and casino attendance. 
The findings of this study should be informative to forecasters, policy analysts, and policy 
makers as to the potential revenue impact of increases in casino taxes. Based on the elasticity 
estimates, it appears that at least small tax rate increases could potentially generate additional tax 
revenue and not have a severe impact on wagering handle. Thus, the base response might be 
small and predictable and revenue projections could be done relatively accurately. This assumes 
that casinos would respond to small rate increases solely by changing the win percentage and not 
making other operational changes. 
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9Table I: FY 2006 Gaming Tax Collections Relative to Total State Tax Collections, States 
with Casinos (dollar amounts in millions)
State Gaming Taxes







































6Gaming tax amount is computed as the racetrack casino win minus amounts retained by racetrack owner 
for general purpose use.
7Gaming tax data obtained from annual financial reports of state gaming regulators and lottery agencies. 





4Racetrack casinos operate as lottery retailers, with the gaming tax computed as the racetrack casino win 
minus the lottery retailer commission paid to racetrack owner.
5Maine financials for November 2005 to June 2006. Oklahoma financials for October 2005 to June 2006. 
Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Dakota financials for FY 2005.
10Table II: Panel Summary Statistics
Variable
1 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Handle
2 335.99 284.68 3.22 1,598.99
Days
2 345.12 64.57 6.00 366.00
EGDs
2 1,135.58 617.92 200.00 3,310.00
Table Games
2 41.40 27.86 0.00 178.00
Win%
2 6.99 1.25 4.71 12.14
Win% Squared 50.39 19.38 22.16 147.40
Cruising Requirement
3,4 0.35 0.46 0.00 1.00
Loss Limit
3,4 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Income
5 21,967.11 2,427.27 15,871.82 26,625.96
Time Trend 9.74 3.67 1.00 15.00
5Data obtained from U. S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, State and Local Personal Income.
1n=465. Dollar amounts are real dollars (base year=1991). 
4Binary dummy variable. Mean equals the percentage of sample observations with score equal to 
one.
2Data obtained from monthly financial reports: Illinois Gaming Board, http://www.igb.state.il.us; 
Indiana Gaming Commission, http://www.state.in.us/gaming; Iowa Gaming and Racing Board, 
http://www.iowa.gov/irgc/; Missouri Gaming Commission, http://www.mgc
3Data obtained from annual reports: Illinois Gaming Board, http://www.igb.state.il.us; Indiana 
Gaming Commission, http://www.state.in.us/gaming; Iowa Gaming and Racing Board, 
http://www.iowa.gov/irgc/; Missouri Gaming Commission, http://www.mgc.dps.mo.gov
11Table III: Regression Estimates
Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -2.465779*** -1.788003*** -1.449593***
(0.3369437) (0.3415046) (0.3277336)
LN(Days) 0.9656574*** 0.9285181*** 0.928518***
(0.0359599) (0.036484) (0.036484)
LN(EGDs) 0.5534192*** 0.5355861*** 0.5355864***
(0.1065088) (0.1028671) (0.1028671)
LN(Table Games) 0.0047174 0.0107691 0.0107691
(0.0420782) (0.0403974) (0.0403975)
LN(Win%) -0.7540078*** -0.8754113*** -0.8754113***
(0.1825624) (0.17861) (0.17861)
LN(Win%t-1) - - -
LN(Win%t-2) - - -
LN(Win%t-3) - - -
Win% - - -
Win% Squared - - -
Cruising Requirement - -0.1839969*** -0.183997***
(0.0566787) (0.0566787)
Loss Limit - -0.6179297*** -0.6179295***
(0.2125193) (0.2125193)
Time Trend - -0.0225486**
(0.010375)
(Time Trend)*LN(Win%) - - -
LN(Income) - - -
LN(Income)*LN(Win%) - - -
Within R-Squared 0.7334*** 0.7461*** 0.7461***
NOTES:
*.05<p<=.10; **.01<p<=.05; ***p<=.01.
Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All regression 
models include casino and year fixed effects. All dollar amounts are real dollars (base year=1991) and all 
percentages are measured on a 0 -100 sca
Dependent Variable = LN(Per Capita EGD Handle). Groups=50, Observations=414.
12Table III: Regression Estimates (Continued)
Variable  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant -20.74335*** -19.41579*** -17.94522***
(4.293482) (4.20456) (2.410878)
LN(Days) 0.9337485*** 0.9337483*** 1.227875***
(0.0365292) (0.0365292) (0.2676029)
LN(EGDs) 0.5481851*** 0.5481844*** 0.5875367***
(0.1026696) (0.1026696) (0.0719595)
LN(Table Games) -0.0032298 -0.0032297 -0.0164296
(0.0409476) (0.0409476) (0.0185584)
LN(Win%) -0.8707295*** -0.8707306*** -0.59467***
(0.1779422) (0.1779422) (0.1348411)
LN(Win%t-1) - - -0.5138041***
(0.1321885)
LN(Win%t-2) - - -0.0099853
(0.1098575)
LN(Win%t-3) - - 0.1541337
(0.0973546)
Win% - - -
Win% Squared - -
Cruising Requirement -0.2003658*** -0.2003658*** -0.2330055***
(0.0571207) (0.0571208) (0.0316126)
Loss Limit -0.6216122*** -0.6216115*** -0.7153513**
(0.2115903) (0.2115903) (0.2877591)
Time Trend - -0.0884444*** -0.0091707
(0.0185407) (0.0078396)
(Time Trend)*LN(Win%) - - -
LN(Income) 1.879111** 1.879091* 1.435763***
(1.024918) (1.024916) (0.5233082)
LN(Income)*LN(Win%) -
Within R-Squared 0.7479*** 0.7479*** 0.7057***
NOTES:
Dependent Variable = LN(Per Capita EGD Handle). Groups=50, Observations=414.
Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All regression 
models include casino and year fixed effects. All dollar amounts are real dollars (base year=1991) and all 
percentages are measured on a 0 -100 sca
*.05<p<=.10; **.01<p<=.05; ***p<=.01.
Table III: Regression Estimates (Continued)
13Variable  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant -19.08318*** -5.957588 -20.49137***
(4.227141) (10.37355) (4.164611)
LN(Days) 0.9353964*** 0.9354919*** 0.935671***
(0.036844) (0.0370167) (0.0363304)
LN(EGDs) 0.5484045*** 0.5513903*** 0.5409275***
(0.1028024) (0.1027121) (0.1028185)
LN(Table Games) -0.0023103 -0.0028883 -0.0046535
(0.0409376) (0.0408533) (0.0410805)
LN(Win%) -1.068686*** -8.941377 -
(0.3626586) (12.87367)
LN(Win%t-1) - - -
LN(Win%t-2) - - -
LN(Win%t-3) - - -




Cruising Requirement -0.200378*** -0.1971549*** -0.2017564***
(0.0570293) (0.0572236) (0.057338)
Loss Limit -0.6465964*** -0.6419865*** -0.6546411***
(0.2141717) (0.2121298) (0.2206406)
Time Trend -0.1551512* -0.0475298*** -0.0459735***
(0.0803789) (0.0168568) (0.0167437)
(Time Trend)*LN(Win%) 0.0232493 - -
(0.0374455)
LN(Income) 1.914514* 0.4626729 1.859222*
(1.027006) (2.481412) (1.02525)
LN(Income)*LN(Win%) - 0.8097809 -
(1.292079)
Within R-Squared 0.7466*** 0.7453*** 0.7515***
NOTES:
Dependent Variable = LN(Per Capita EGD Handle). Groups=50, Observations=414.
Entries are fixed-effects panel regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All regression 
models include casino and year fixed effects. All dollar amounts are real dollars (base year=1991) and all 
percentages are measured on a 0 -100 sca
*.05<p<=.10; **.01<p<=.05; ***p<=.01.
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